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Actual Versus Perceived
Performance of Judges
Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi

P

erceptions of judges ought to be based on their performance. Yet, few studies of the relation between perceived
and actual judicial performance exist. Those claiming
judicial bias should be especially sensitive to the relation
between perception and performance. Judges perceived by the
public or by the legal community as disfavoring a group may
be regarded as biased, but that perception is unfair if the
judges’ votes in cases do not disfavor the group. For example,
it may be unfair to accuse an appellate judge of pro-state bias
in criminal cases if the judge votes for defendants at a higher
rate than several other judges on the same court. This article
addresses whether perception matches reality. Several studies
have examined perceptions of judges and courts by surveying
the public about its confidence in a particular court.1 Our
study differs because it compares perceptions of individual justices with their actual voting patterns.
Incomplete samples are one source of distorted claims about
judicial behavior. Excluding a particular group of outcomes,

such as unanimous decisions, can lead to questionable results.2
Studies regularly report that a judge’s political affiliation, race,
or sex is associated with case outcomes—results that sometimes raise inferences of bias.3 At the trial-court level, most
studies are limited to available opinions, a known source of
possible distortion.4 These studies also tend to exclude cases
that end via settlement, which is the modal outcome in civil litigation.5 Several trial-court-level studies that use complete case
samples and find no political or other effects suggest the
importance of complete case samples.6
At the appellate level, samples may exclude screening decisions by courts with discretionary jurisdiction. Judges’ screening decisions in discretionary cases—the decisions whether to
grant full review of cases—often are not publicly available.7 Yet
these screening decisions can comprise the bulk of a judge’s
work.8 Also, studies may not account for the nonrandom
aspects of assignment, with variation in outcome demonstrated when analysts consider the effects of nonrandom

This article is based on Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi
Rosen-Zvi, Actual Versus Perceived Performance of Judges, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 615 (2012). We thank Na’ama Schlam and Noam
Guttman for their invaluable research assistance and insightful
comments, as well as for coordinating the student work in a
superb manner. We are also grateful to Efrat Zilberbush, Na’ama
Daniel, Nitzan Ilani, and Gadi Ezra for their assistance in collecting the data. This article benefited from comments at faculty
workshops at Bar-Ilan University and Haifa University, from comments on it at the Fourth Annual Taubenschlag Lecture at Tel Aviv
University Buchmann Faculty of Law, and from comments at the
Symposium on Racial Bias and the Criminal Justice System, February 16-17, Seattle University School of Law. This study was supported in part by a research grant from Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law at Tel Aviv University. We also thank
Robert B. Diener and David S. Litman, Cornell Law School class
of 1982 and founders of the Cornell Law School-Tel Aviv University Exchange Initiative, for their support.

3. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
4. Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 213, 234-36 (2009).
5. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is
the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 111 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Judicial Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010); Laura Beth Nielsen
et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States,
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188 (2010) (political party of the
presiding judge is not associated with outcomes of employment
discrimination litigation); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1337 (1998).
7. Significant differences exist in judges’ screening behavior.
Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Case Selection
and Dissent in Courts of Last Resort: An Empirical Study of the Israel
Supreme Court, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (Yunchien Chang ed. forthcoming 2013).
8. See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at tbl.1-2 (showing less than 15% of discretionary civil or criminal appeals are
granted review by the Israel Supreme Court); The Statistics, 125
HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2011) (showing 1.1% of petitions to U.S.
Supreme Court are granted review).

Footnotes
1. E.g., Charles M. Cameron & Jee-Kwang Park, How Will They Vote?
Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme Court Nominees, 19372006, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 485 (2009) (using preconfirmation information to assess justices’ political ideology and predict
their future behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court); James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity,
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507 (2007) (assessing perceptions of
the U.S. Supreme Court).
2. Kevin R. Tully & E. Phelps Gay, Louisiana Supreme Court Defended:
A Rebuttal of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical
and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial
Function, 69 LA. L. REV. 281, 289 (2009) (criticizing study of individual justices for excluding all unanimous cases from the data).
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assignment.9 Some studies of judiciaries, run at the behest of
special-interest groups, seem to have little interest in presenting a balanced picture of judicial behavior.10
Are perceptions of judicial performance accurate if the sample used to assess judges’ behavior is complete, no screening of
cases is present, random assignment is used or nonrandom
assignment features are accounted for, and an interest group is
not trying to shape perceptions? This article uses such a sample to compare actual judicial performance with perceptions of
judicial behavior, as reflected in 2,106 responses to a survey of
166 actors in the Israeli legal community. To gauge actual judicial performance, we use two full years (2006 and 2007) of
criminal cases decided by the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC). The
sample consists of 1,410 mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases
and 48 discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases. We compare
justices’ actual behavior in criminal cases to survey respondents’ rankings of those justices. The results suggest little association between the reality of judicial performance in the mass
of cases and perceptions of that performance by the legal community. Because actual performance in the mass of criminal
cases is not associated with perceived performance, we explore
alternative sources of perceptions: media reports, votes in discretionary-jurisdiction cases, and differences among surveyed
respondent groups.
Although our study is limited to one country, the results suggest caution in concluding that judges favor one group or the
other—one possible definition of bias. The limited association
between perception and reality suggests that claims of bias
should be based on careful analysis of judges’ actual behavior,
rather than on either casual observation or only a few cases.
This article first provides background information about the
Israeli judiciary. It then presents survey results regarding the
Israeli legal community’s perceptions of 16 ISC justices’ tendencies in criminal cases. The survey asked respondents the
degree to which they believe individual justices are favorable to
the state or to defendants. We then compare the survey results
with justices’ actual voting patterns in criminal cases. The article explores the differences between perceptions and reality.
THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY11

Israel is a unitary state with a single system of traditional
courts of general jurisdiction, as well as other tribunals or
authorities with judicial power that have jurisdiction limited
by subject matter or persons covered. Within the traditional

9. Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on
Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 394 (2010); Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574 (2010).
10. Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey:
Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
969, 970 (2009).
11. The description of the Israeli judiciary is based on the description
in Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Does the
Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court of Last
Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 246 (2012).
12. See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38

courts, the judiciary law establishes three levels of courts: the
ISC, district courts, and magistrate courts.12 District courts and
magistrate courts are trial courts; the ISC functions as both an
appellate court and as the High Court of Justice (HCJ). In its
HCJ capacity, the ISC operates as a court of first and last
instance, primarily in areas relating to government behavior.
Because the ISC’s HCJ function is not as an appellate court, this
study excludes those cases. The study does consider HCJ information relating to workload (in contrast to HCJ outcomes)
because the HCJ workload can affect justices’ assignments to
appellate cases.
The basic trial courts are the 29 magistrate courts. Magistrate courts serve the locality and district in which they sit, and
they generally have criminal jurisdiction over offenses with a
potential punishment of up to seven years of imprisonment.
They have civil jurisdiction in matters involving up to a specified monetary amount—currently 2.5 million shekels
(approximately U.S. $690,000)—as well as over the use, possession, and division of real property. Magistrate courts also
serve as traffic courts, municipal courts, family courts, and
small-claims courts. A single judge usually presides in each
case unless the president of the magistrate court directs a panel
of three judges to hear the case.13
Six local district courts have residual jurisdiction in any
matter that is not within the sole jurisdiction of another
court.14 As courts of first instance, district courts exercise jurisdiction over criminal cases punishable by more than seven
years’ imprisonment. District courts’ civil jurisdiction extends
to matters in which more than 2.5 million shekels are in dispute. District courts also serve as administrative courts and
hear cases that deal with, inter alia, companies and partnerships, arbitrations, prisoners’ petitions, and appeals on tax
matters. These courts have appellate jurisdiction over magistrate court judgments.15
The ISC has jurisdiction to hear criminal and civil appeals
from judgments of the district courts. Cases that begin in a district court are appealable, as of right, to the ISC. Other matters,
particularly the mass of cases that begin in the magistrate
courts, may be appealed only with the Court’s permission. The
ISC’s decisions are binding on lower courts, and Israel adheres
to the principle of stare decisis.16 The ISC generally sits in panels comprising three justices. The president or the deputy president of the Court may expand the size of the panel to any
uneven number of justices, but that happened so rarely during

LSI 271 (1983-1984) (Isr.).
13. Id. ch. 2, art. 3.
14. Ordinances of Courts (Establishment of The Central District
Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824 (Isr.).
15. Generally, a panel is composed of a single district-court judge,
though a panel of three judges hears appeals of magistrate court
judgments and cases of first instance when the offense is punishable by ten or more years of imprisonment. A three-judge panel
also sits when the president or deputy president of the district
court so directs. Courts Law (Consolidated Version) ch. 2, art. 2.
16. Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, SH No. 1110 p. 78, § 20
(Isr.).
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the two years examined in this study that it did not require further consideration.17
Courts sitting on appeal, whether district courts or the ISC,
are formally authorized to adjudicate issues of both fact and
law, but they seldom intervene in factual matters and tend to
limit their judgment to questions of law.18 The underlying rationale is that on appeal, judges usually are not directly exposed to
witnesses and other types of evidence. This does not negate the
ability of the appellate court to examine whether the factual
basis for the decision of the lower court is anchored on sound
evidentiary foundations, but the de facto appeal practice is not
one of de novo review.19 Our study focuses primarily on mandatory criminal appeals, which are regulated in a slightly different
manner than civil appeals under Israeli law. We describe only
the criminal appeals process here and refer the reader to our
description of civil appeals elsewhere.20
In criminal cases, a verdict issued by the district court sitting in the first instance can be appealed to the ISC as a matter
of right.21 A verdict issued by the magistrate court in the first
instance can be appealed to the district court as a matter of
right. In Israel, both prosecution and defense have symmetrical rights of appeal, as the prosecution is authorized to appeal
a defendant’s acquittal. When a case is initiated in the magistrate court and appealed to the district court, both the prosecution and the defense can petition the ISC for a second appellate review.22
The requirements governing discretionary ISC appellate
review laid down in Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or,23 the most
cited precedent in Israeli caselaw,24 apply to criminal and civil
cases.25 Chenion Haifa states that the ISC should grant discretionary review only when significant legal or public issues are
at stake that transcend the interests of the litigating parties.
Such legal or public issues may include, for example, conflicting rulings by lower courts or matters of constitutional significance. Under this standard, the lower-court result should not
affect the decision to grant a discretionary appeal. Therefore,
according to the standard of review, a defendant’s argument
concerning the stigmatizing effect of conviction26 or even the

Methodology
We used an online survey to ask members of the Israeli legal
community their opinions of the degree to which individual
justices favored the state or defendants in criminal cases. The
survey’s first part asked respondents to rate each justice based
on the respondent’s view of the justice’s pro-prosecution or
pro-defendant tendencies. The second part asked respondents
about their position in the Israeli legal community.31 In an initial survey of the Israeli legal community in September and
October 2011 and in a follow-up survey limited to law students in November 2011, recipients were invited to participate
through an email containing a hyperlink to an online survey
site. The invitations were sent to the following: (1) faculty
members of all university and college law schools in Israel; (2)
all alumni of Tel Aviv University Law Faculty; (3) approximately 150 current law students at Tel Aviv University belonging to the classes of 2012 through 2014, as well as advanceddegree students; (4) all public defenders in Israel; (5) many
prominent law firms operating in Israel; (6) a select group of
prestigious criminal lawyers; and (7) the Attorney General’s
office. We lacked direct access to public prosecutors; therefore,
we requested that the Attorney General’s office assist us in
internally distributing the survey. It is unclear whether the survey was distributed, and we suspect that it was not. The few
responses we received from public prosecutors were probably
due to their parallel affiliations (such as Tel Aviv University
alumni). The online software allowed a recipient to provide

17. Each panel also has the power to decide to expand its size, and the
Court can also decide to initiate a “further hearing” in which a
panel of five or more justices will rehear a case decided by a
smaller ISC panel. A single justice may hear petitions for injunctions, temporary restraining orders, or other interim rulings, as
well as for an order nisi, but a single justice may not refuse to
grant an order nisi or make it contingent on only some of its assertions. A single justice may hear appeals against interim rulings by
district courts or against the verdict of a single district-court judge
hearing an appeal from a case in a magistrate’s court. Courts Law
(Consolidated Version) §§ 26, 30.
18. See CrimA 4297/98 Hershtik v. State of Israel 54(4) PD 673, 682
(2000) (Isr.).
19. See CrimA 125/50 Ya’akobovitch v. Attorney General 6(1) PD 514
(1952) (Isr.).
20. Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Israel’s
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 700-04 (2011).
21. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version) § 41(a).
22. Unlike the situation in civil cases, interim trial-court decisions in

criminal cases cannot be appealed except under limited circumstances, such as judicial disqualification. Criminal Procedure Law
(Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36 LSI 35, §§ 146-47 (19811982) (Isr.).
23. CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123 (1982) (Isr.).
24. See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 702 n.48.
25. See DC 4927/92 State of Israel v. Ben Yehuda (unpublished opinion) (1992) (Isr.).
26. CrimA 1245/93 Shtarkman v. State of Israel 47(2) PD 177 (1993)
(Isr.).
27. DC 3251/91 Yishai v. State of Israel PD 45(5) 441 (1991) (Isr.).
Prior work questions adherence to the Chenion Haifa standards.
Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 720.
28. Criminal Procedure Rules, 5734-1974, § 44(7) (Isr.).
29. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36
LSI 35, § 205 (1981-1982) (Isr.).
30. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7.
31. The survey appears as an appendix to Theodore Eisenberg, Talia
Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Actual Versus Perceived Performance of
Judges, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 615 (2012).
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severity of punishment are not grounds for a second appellate
review.27
A single justice usually reviews a request for discretionary
appeal, but a panel of three justices can also review the
request.28 When a three-justice panel reviews the request, the
panel is authorized to treat the request as an actual appeal and
can decide the case on its merits.29 As discussed previously,
discretionary appeals are usually based on a preliminary
screening by a single justice, a process we explore elsewhere.30
PERCEPTIONS OF ISC JUSTICES

Higher number = more pro-defendant
2
3
4
5

Respondents could reply that they had “no opinion” about
a justice. The survey included all 16 ISC justices who served in
2006 to 2007.
The survey’s second part asked respondents to self-identify
with one of the following groups (each group’s number of
respondents is in parentheses): (a) private practitioner with an
emphasis on civil law (civil attorneys) (23); (b) private practitioner with an emphasis on criminal law (criminal attorneys)
(16); (c) law professor (23); (d) state attorney (6); (e) public
defender (16); (f) law student (73); and (g) other (9). For
some purposes, we combined the criminal attorneys and public defenders into a single group labeled “defense lawyers.” We
aggregated these groups because they represent criminal defendants and might be expected to have similar views of justices.
The results of our earlier work—used in the analysis
below—describe the actual pattern of justices’ votes32 and were
not made publicly available until the survey period closed. The
surveys yielded 2,656 responses pertaining to individual justices provided by 166 respondents. We removed the “no opinion” responses from the analysis, resulting in 2,106 responses.
The “Total” column in Table 1 shows the responses for each
justice less the “no opinion” responses, which ranged from a
high of 158 for Justice Barak to a low of 94 for Justice Berliner.
The “Total” row in Table 1 shows the number of responses
from each respondent group without the “no opinion”
responses. When appropriate, our analysis accounts for the
nonindependence of observations by the same respondent.
Due to the sampling process, we cannot be sure that the
respondents are a random draw from the Israeli legal community, and our findings are subject to this limitation. Although
we solicited a broad range of respondents, we could not ensure
responses to our invitations.

FIGURE 1.
MEANS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICES
ALL RESPONDENTS

1

only one response per justice.
The survey asked respondents to “rank each justice according to your view of their pro prosecution or pro defendant
views” on a five-point scale, which was coded as follows:
Very pro prosecution: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Somewhat pro prosecution: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Neither pro prosecution nor pro defendant: . . . . . . . . 3
Somewhat pro defendant: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Very pro defendant: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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Note: The figure shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of
2011 that asked about the respondents’ perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or prodefendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most prostate. The y-axis shows the mean response for each justice across all survey respondents.
The lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each justice. Justices are ordered
along in x-axis in ascending order of pro-defendant perception.

Survey Results
Table 1 and Figure 1 report the pattern of results by justice
and respondent group. The first row of Table 1 shows the mean
responses of the respondent groups for each justice on the fivepoint scale described previously. The second row shows the
number of respondents with respect to that justice. For example, the first two rows of the “Civil Attorneys” column show
that civil attorneys had a mean response of 1.91 based on 23
respondents with respect to Justice Arbel.
The overall mean of the 2,106 responses was 2.70, which is

somewhat below the nominally neutral response of three on
the survey’s five-point scale. Given that the ISC affirmed over
80% of the mandatory criminal appeals,33 it is understandable
why the respondents regarded justices as being somewhat
favorable to the state. Indeed, only the state attorneys’
responses averaged above three, and their mean of 3.03 barely
exceeds that number.
Figure 1 shows the mean response for each justice, designated by the filled circles, and a measure of the uncertainty in
the responses. The uncertainty measure consists of the upper
and lower 95% confidence intervals, indicated by the lines
emanating from the circles. The mean responses are taken from
the justice means in Table 1. The x-axis depicts the justices,
with the justice perceived as most favorable to the state appearing closest to the origin and the justice perceived as most
favorable to defendants included as the last justice on the xaxis. Thus, Justice Arbel was perceived as most favorable to the
state and Justice Elon was perceived as least favorable. The
confidence intervals suggest that statistically significant differences exist for several pairs of justices. For example, no overlap in confidence intervals exists for Justice Arbel and any justice other than Justice Berliner. Only two justices have lower
95% confidence intervals that exclude three, but several justices have upper 95% confidence intervals that exclude three.
The groups with presumably greater experience and information about ISC activity perceived the court differently. Table
1 shows that perceptions of criminal attorneys and public
defenders did not substantially differ in their means. The data
also indicate that defense lawyers divide the justices into three
groups, with five justices (Arbel, Berliner, Beinisch, Naor, and
Levy) perceived as substantially pro-state, four justices (Rubin-

32. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11.
33. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11. Affirmance rates of
about 80% in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases are not
unusual. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dis-

sent, and Variability in State Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1479 tbl.4 (2009) (showing
such rates in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases resolved by
U.S. state supreme courts).
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stein, Kheshin, Melcer, and Elon) perceived as moderately prodefendant, and the remaining seven justices perceived as being
between the other two groups.
The few state-attorney responses produced imprecise estimates. Nevertheless, a noticeable difference was their generally
more pro-defendant perception of the ISC. Table 1 shows that
their mean perception score was 3.03, which makes them the
only group that regarded the justices as pro-defendant on our
scale. Nine justices had mean perception scores of three or

more, so the pro-defendant average of state attorneys was not
a consequence of extreme views of one or two justices. Within
this generally more pro-defendant perception, state attorneys
shared with defense lawyers the relative perceptions of Justices
Arbel, Berliner, and Levy as being pro-state. Thus, the two
groups with direct litigation experience—defense lawyers and
state attorneys—while representing clients with opposing
interests, shared a view of Justice Levy as being relatively prostate. Law professors had the opposite perception of him. In

TABLE 1. PERCEIVED PROPENSITY OF VOTING FOR DEFENDANT OR STATE,
BY JUSTICE AND RESPONDENT GROUP
JUSTICE

CIVIL
ATTORNEYS

CRIMINAL
ATTORNEYS

LAW
PROFESSORS

LAW
STUDENTS

PUBLIC
DEFENDERS

STATE
ATTORNEYS

OTHER

TOTAL

1.91

1.40

1.53

2.34

1.63

2.17

2.25

1.98

23

15

19

59

16

6

8

146

2.76

2.25

2.29

3.04

2.63

3.40

3.13

2.80

21

16

21

71

16

5

8

158

2.09

1.56

1.68

2.88

1.88

2.83

2.57

2.35

22

16

22

67

16

6

7

156

2.00

2.20

2.21

3.00

1.15

2.50

2.80

2.28

18

15

14

25

13

4

5

94

Elon

3.50

3.25

3.79

3.06

3.57

3.75

3.40

3.33

16

12

14

49

14

4

5

114

Fogelman

2.83

2.85

2.43

3.11

2.46

3.00

3.00

2.83

18

13

14

27

13

5

8

98

2.53

2.56

2.47

2.78

2.79

2.75

3.00

2.69

19

16

19

59

14

4

7

138

2.57

2.29

2.29

2.89

2.73

3.00

3.00

2.69

21

14

17

55

15

5

7

134

3.10

2.73

2.50

3.20

3.00

2.60

2.71

2.99

20

15

18

64

15

5

7

144

3.07

2.90

2.67

2.72

3.38

3.25

2.75

2.87

14

10

12

53

13

4

4

110

2.22

1.53

3.05

2.76

2.00

2.00

3.00

2.47

23

15

19

54

15

6

7

139

2.94

3.83

3.29

2.94

3.31

3.80

3.67

3.20

16

12

14

48

16

5

6

117

Naor

2.05

1.79

2.16

2.75

1.81

2.80

2.71

2.37

22

14

19

63

16

5

7

146

Procaccia

2.64

2.33

2.50

3.20

2.20

3.50

3.13

2.83

22

15

18

61

15

4

8

143

2.60

3.00

2.76

3.07

2.58

4.00

3.13

2.95

15

16

17

54

12

4

8

126

2.95

3.20

2.25

2.64

3.19

3.67

2.50

2.79

22

15

20

56

16

6

8

143

2.57

2.44

2.44

2.89

2.51

3.03

2.91

2.70

312

229

277

865

235

78

110

2106

Arbel
Barak
Beinisch
Berliner

Grunis
Hayut
Joubran
Kheshin, D
Levy
Melcer

Rivlin
Rubinstein
Total

Note: The table shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of 2011 that asked about the respondents’ perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or
pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state.
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34. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7; Eisenberg, Fisher &
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11; Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra
note 20, at 709.
35. We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the database by
comparing it with data obtained from the ISC’s secretariat. This
comparison suggested that the IJA website data are indeed comprehensive, covering the full gamut of cases. The website does not
include cases decided in camera. But since those cases are an
insubstantial fraction of the cases decided by the Court, the omis-
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To compare perceptions with justices’ actual voting behavior,
we used the justices’ votes in cases. We used data employed in
earlier studies of ISC appellate cases, which included discussions of the data’s limitations.34 We describe here relevant
aspects of the data.
The case outcomes with which we compare perceptions are
mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases
decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007. The study
includes every ISC substantive opinion available online via the
official Israel Judicial Authority (IJA) website for cases decided
during that time period. Since the IJA website contains all of the
cases decided by the ISC,35 the resulting database provides a
complete picture of ISC doctrinal decisional activity.
The cases identified by the above methods were coded by
student research assistants. Before the student coding, the
authors designed a data form to structure the coding. After
review of the performance of the form and the students in an
initial set of cases, the form was revised and a final form constructed. The students used that revised form to code the cases
under our supervision.
The outcome variable is each justice’s vote in each case.
“Vote for defendant” is a dummy variable recording the direction of each justice’s vote. A justice’s vote favored the state if a
justice voted to affirm a decision on an appeal brought by a
defendant or reverse a decision on an appeal brought by the
state. A vote favored the defendant if it was a vote to affirm a
decision on an appeal brought by the state or to reverse a decision on an appeal brought by the defendant. A justice’s vote
could differ from the case’s outcome if a justice dissented, which

Elon
Melcer
Mean survey sscore
2.5
3

ISC JUSTICES’ ACTUAL PERFORMANCES COMPARED
TO PERCEPTIONS

rarely occurred in the ISC in the time period studied.36 We
excluded about 4.5% of votes in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases because they involved votes that we did not characterize as favoring the defendant or the state, such as “approved
in part and denied in part.”
Table 2, based on our earlier work,37 reports each justice’s
votes for mandatory and discretionary cases. It also shows the
number of each type of case (mandatory or discretionary) the
justices voted in and each justice’s rank, as measured by the
justice’s rate of voting for defendants. The dominant pattern
was that the state was more successful than criminal defendants.38 The lowest rate at which any justice voted in favor of
the state was 72%, as shown in the first numerical column. The
range of pro-defendant vote percentages was broader in discretionary cases, but these percentages were based on far fewer
cases than the mandatory-case percentages. The ISC grants
review in a small fraction of discretionary cases.
Regression analysis in our earlier work controlled for nonrandom aspects of case assignment—case-category specialization, workload, and seniority—as well as for the most serious
crime present in a case, and the gender of defendants.39 It confirmed that Table 2’s mandatory-case columns provided a reasonable ordering of justices’ tendencies to vote for the state or
defendants. By exploiting the use of random case assignment
and controlling for nonrandom aspects of case assignment, the
methodology accounted for the varying merits of cases pre-
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Kheshin, D.
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RubinsteinProcaccia
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Hayut
Grunis
Levy
Naor

Beinisch
Berliner

2

contrast, the state attorneys’ perception of Justice Joubran was
closer to the perception of law professors than it was to the perception of defense lawyers. Defense lawyers regarded Justice
Joubran as relatively pro-defendant, whereas law professors and
state attorneys regarded him as more pro-state.
A consistent result across all groups was the pro-state perception of Justice Arbel. She was perceived as the most pro-state
justice, or one of the most pro-state justices, by all groups. Justices Elon and Melcer were consistently regarded as pro-defendant, and a substantial group of justices was perceived as
between the two extremes by all groups. Regression models,
not reported here, confirm the pattern in Table 1. All justices
were perceived to be more pro-defendant than Justice Arbel,
and that those differences were statistically significant.
We defer possible explanations of the survey results until
after we report the justices’ actual votes.

Arbel
.1

.15

.2

.25

.3

Pro-defendant vote rate

Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and justices’ votes in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli
legal community shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents’ perceptions of ISC
justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five,
with one being the most pro-state. The rates at which justices voted for the state’s position in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases were based on cases decided by the ISC in
the years 2006 and 2007.

sion does not materially affect the analysis here. See Courts Law
(Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, § 70(a) (19831984) (Isr.).
36. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7.
37. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11, at 283 tbl.18.
38. The state is more successful both in cases appealed by defendants
and in cases appealed by the state. Id.
39. Id. at 279 tbl.17.
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sented to justices. Differences in justices’ rates of voting for the
two parties are thus reasonably attributable to justices, not to
case characteristics.
How do the perceptions compare with the justices’ performances as reflected in Table 2? We first compare performance
in mandatory-jurisdiction cases with survey scores. We then
compare performance in discretionary-jurisdiction cases with
survey scores.

lower left to upper right. That is, a justice with a relatively high
rate of voting for defendants who is also perceived as being relatively pro-defendant should be located in the upper-right portion of the figure. A justice with a relatively low rate of voting
for defendants who is also perceived as being relatively prostate should be located in the lower-left portion of the figure.
The figure shows an unexpected pattern. The data flow, if
anything, from upper left to lower right. A simple correlation
coefficient was negative but insignificant (-.27; p = .307), suggesting little association between perceptions and voting patterns. Justices perceived as pro-defendant tended to vote for the
state. Perceptions of Justice Naor were relatively pro-state, but
her voting pattern was most favorable to defendants. Justices
Elon and Melcer show the opposite combination: perceived to
be pro-defendant but with low rates of voting for defendants.
Justice Fogelman, who had the most pro-state voting pattern,
was perceived to be relatively neutral. No justice who was perceived as being relatively pro-defendant (Justices Elon, Melcer,
Joubran, and Rivlin) actually tended to vote for defendants.40
Justice Arbel’s position was distinctive. As Table 1 and Figure 1
show, she was the justice perceived to be the most pro-state. Yet
she was average in her rate of pro-state votes. We conclude that

Survey Scores and Mandatory-Jurisdiction Case Performance
Figure 2 shows the relation between survey scores and justices’ votes in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. The data points in
Figure 2, indicated by justices’ names, represent each justice’s
rate of voting for defendants, as shown on the x-axis, and that
justice’s mean survey score, as shown on the y-axis. For example, Justice Naor voted for defendants in 27.8% of her cases,
the highest rate of any justice. Her mean survey score, as
shown in Table 1, was 2.37, well below the overall survey
mean. Her combination of votes and survey scores is therefore
represented by her location in the lower-right portion of Figure 2. If survey perceptions reflected justices’ observed rates of
voting for defendants, then the data points should flow from

TABLE 2. RATE AND RANK OF JUSTICES’ VOTING FOR STATE BY JURISDICTIONAL SOURCE
MANDATORY CASES
JUSTICE

N

JUSTICE’S
MANDATORY CASE
RANK

JUSTICE’S
DISCRETIONARY
CASE RANK

DISCRETIONARY CASES

Rate favoring
defendant

N

Rate favoring
defendant

Fogelman

.12

168

1.00

4

2

13

Elon

.13

167

.80

5

2

4

Melcer

.13

86

1.00

3

2

13

Levy

.14

829

.87

23

4

12

Rivlin

.14

142

.80

5

4

4

Arbel

.15

351

.82

17

6

8

Berliner

.15

274

.60

5

6

2

Joubran

.16

446

.80

20

8

4

Rubinstein

.16

434

.85

20

8

10

Beinisch

.17

150

.57

7

10

1

Kheshin, D.

.17

195

.80

5

10

4

Procaccia

.19

138

.85

13

12

10

Grunis

.20

169

1.00

5

13

13

Hayut

.21

215

.83

6

14

9

Barak

.23

43

1.00

1

15

13

Naor

.28

154

.60

5

16

2

Note: The table shows the rate at which each justice voted for the state’s position in mandatory and discretionary criminal cases. A vote favored the state if it was to affirm an appeal
brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote favored the defendant if it was to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by
the defendant. The last two columns show the ordinal rank of each justice for mandatory and discretionary cases. The ordinal rank is based on the rate at which justices voted for the
state in criminal cases, with a lower rank corresponding to voting more often for the state. The cases are mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases decided by the ISC
in the years 2006 and 2007.

40. Justices Levy and Berliner were perhaps the justices with the best
match of perceptions of their voting tendency and their actual voting patterns. They were both perceived as being relatively prostate, and both voted in favor of the state more than most other
justices. Conversely, Justice Rivlin was perceived as fourth most
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favorable to defendants, yet his voting pattern tended to be more
pro-state. A substantial number of justices were perceived as being
neither very pro-state nor very pro-defendant, and their voting
patterns reflected that neutrality.

justices’ actual voting patterns in mandatory criminal cases
contribute nothing whatsoever to explaining perceptions of justices as being pro-state or pro-defendant.
Survey Scores and Discretionary-Jurisdiction Case
Performance
We previously noted justices’ significantly different voting
patterns in mandatory and discretionary cases.41 Discretionary
cases, for which basic statistics are reported in Table 2 above,
therefore provide a second possible basis for explaining the
survey-scores pattern. Figure 3 shows the relation between
survey scores and justices’ performance in discretionary cases.
The data points are again indicated by justices’ names, with
justices’ rates of voting for defendants (now in discretionary
cases) shown on the x-axis and their mean survey scores
shown on the y-axis. The expected pattern of data flow from
lower left to upper right is recognizable, though imperfect. A
justice with a relatively high rate of voting for defendants was
generally perceived as being relatively pro-defendant.
A simple correlation coefficient was positive and nearly significant (.47; p = .065), suggesting a reasonably strong association between perceptions of justices as pro-state or pro-defendant and how justices voted in discretionary-jurisdiction cases.
If one excludes the most outlying point in the figure, Justice
Arbel (discussed below), the coefficient was .56 and significant
at p = .029. However imperfect an association Figure 3 portrays, it is much closer than Figure 2’s mandatory-case pattern
in exhibiting the expected relation between survey scores and
voting patterns.
RECONCILING PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY

The above results suggest two differing relations between
perceptions and reality—a positive association between justices’ votes in discretionary-jurisdiction cases and a negative,
insignificant association in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. This
Part explores that difference, as well as intergroup differences
among survey respondents. It also adds a second possible
source of influence regarding perceptions of justices’ performances: coverage in the media.
Differences Based on Jurisdictional Source and Group
Affiliation
It is plausible that justices’ votes in discretionary cases
would better explain survey scores than votes in mandatory
cases. Justices are supposed to grant review in discretionary

41. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11, at 283.
42. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 720.
43. A similar effect may be at work for Justice Beinisch. She served as
the State Attorney of Israel from 1989 to 1995. Figure 2 indicates
that perceptions of her do not match well with the rate at which
she voted for defendants in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. She was
the most pro-state justice in discretionary-jurisdiction cases, but
that is based on only seven decisions. The pro-state view of her
may stem from her prior position.
From 1972 to 1979, Justice Naor served as Deputy State Attorney in the Ministry of Justice. She is also regarded as relatively
pro-state. Other justices have also served the government in high
legal offices. Justice Barak served as Israel’s Attorney General from

cases based on each case’s importance. Though this principle is
often not honored,42 if a case’s importance plays some role in
discretionary-case selection, then the average discretionary
case is likely more important than the average mandatory case.
Thus, it is reasonable that a more important class of cases
would play a greater role than mandatory cases in shaping the
public’s perceptions of judicial voting tendencies. Yet, the
Court reviews so few discretionary cases compared to mandatory cases—about 3% the number of mandatory cases—that it
is puzzling that discretionary cases influence the legal community’s perception so heavily.
Another factor is likely to help explain the influence of discretionary cases. Attorneys and law students do not read and
code all cases heard by the Court, and they are probably
unaware of the patterns we report in mandatory cases. Mandatory cases therefore cannot be a basis for their perceptions, and
discretionary cases may shape perceptions by default.
Even in discretionary cases, however, the perception and
reality for Justice Arbel do not match. She is perceived as the
most pro-state justice, which is not supported by her voting in
either mandatory or discretionary cases. For many justices, the
small number of discretionary cases they hear makes those
cases an imprecise measure of the justices’ behavior. But Justice Arbel has the fourth highest number of discretionary-case
participations (17), and Table 2 shows that she ranks as the
eighth most favorable justice for defendants (as well as the
sixth most favorable in mandatory cases). Thus, the legal community’s perception of her has no basis in these voting patterns. Justice Arbel served for several years (1996–2004) as the
State Attorney of Israel and thus head of the State Attorney
Office, which represents the state in court. Perceptions of Justice Arbel may be influenced more by her relatively recent
association with the state than by her actual performance in
criminal cases.43
Some of the perception patterns may be explained not only
by the justices’ behavior but also by the survey respondents’
characteristics. Table 1 shows law professors to have a relatively pro-state view of justices and state attorneys to have a
relatively pro-defendant view of justices. We noted above that
state attorneys differ significantly from both criminal lawyers
and from public defenders.
The significant differences between the state attorneys and
the defense lawyers may represent what psychology
researchers call “naïve realism.”44 “[P]eople do not fully appreciate the subjective status of their own construals, and, as

1975 to 1978, and Justice Rubinstein served as Attorney General
from 1997 to 2004. Neither is perceived as very pro-state. There
may be a difference between the way the public perceives former
Attorneys General (less pro-state) compared to how the public
perceives former state attorneys (more pro-state). Attorneys General have often publicly defied the government by refusing to represent the state when they thought the state was in the wrong.
State attorneys, on the other hand, are not in a position to defy the
state, and they are in charge of all the criminal trials.
44. Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naïve Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 (1995).
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FIGURE 3.
RELATION BETWEEN SURVEY RESPONSES AND PRO-DEFENDANT VOTE RATE
DISCRETIONARY-JURISDICTION CASES
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Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and justices’ votes in discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the
Israeli legal community shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents’ perceptions
of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one
to five, with one being the most pro-state. The rates at which justices voted for the state’s
position in discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases were based on cases decided by the
ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.

such, they do not make sufficient allowance for the uncertainties of construal when called on to make behavioral attributions and predictions about others.”45 A similar effect has been
reported in an experiment that assigns participants roles as
defense lawyers or prosecutors.46 If lawyers tend to identify
with their clients’ positions beyond the objective merits of
their cases, then both state attorneys and defense lawyers may
not fully appreciate the subjective status of their own views in
shaping their perceptions of ISC justices. Their inflated perception of the merits of their clients’ positions translates into
an altered view of how the justices treat their clients. Defense

45. Id. at 404.
46. ANDREAS GLÖCKNER & CHRISTOPH ENGEL, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR
RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, ROLE INDUCED BIAS IN COURT: AN
EXPERIMENTAL
ANALYSIS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_37online.pdf.
47. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 272 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 980, 988 (1994) (finding,
for example, that 32% of lawyers report that they never request
court-ordered compensation in excess of normal hourly rates, but
judges report that only 11% of lawyers never make such requests);
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504 (1998) (noting that “there is suggestive evidence that self-serving bias does affect lawyers and judges
as well as other actors”); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
135, 150 (1993) (finding self-serving interpretation of fairness in
study that included law students).
48. E.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW:
POLITICS, THE MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS ch. 5 (2004). As
claimed by Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, “Not only is the media
the main source of knowledge about law for the public at large,
but it is also an important resource for legal professionals and
members of the political elites as well.” Bryna Bogoch & Yifat
Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High
Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 53, 54 (2008).
49. According to the 2010 TGI Research survey, Yediot Aharonot and
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lawyers think the justices are more out of line with their
clients’ innocence or deserved lower sentences, and therefore,
they tend to perceive justices as relatively pro-state. State attorneys think the justices are more out of line with the state’s view
of guilt or deserved higher sentences and therefore tend to perceive justices as relatively pro-defendant. Evidence exists that
lawyers, like other people, also misperceive their own performance and behavior.47
Perceptions and Media Coverage
Perceptions of legal performance can be shaped by media
coverage,48 so media characterizations of justices may influence perceptions of them. To explore this influence, we surveyed newspaper coverage of the 16 justices appearing in the
questionnaire. The newspaper survey included all articles in
two leading Israeli newspapers49—Yediot Aharonot (Ynet) and
Ma’ariv (NRG)—that are available online. These articles
should reasonably reflect media coverage because the vast
majority of articles published in the last decade in these central newspapers are available online. Our sample includes only
articles relating to the criminal-case decisions of each of the
justices, thereby excluding all references relating to other judicial activities (especially in the constitutional realm). In order
not to skew the results, we did not double count similar articles that appeared in both newspapers. The time period
included in the online survey was from 2003 through most of
2011. Table 3 shows the percentage of newspaper articles that
reported pro-defendant tendencies out of the total pool of references to each of the justices.50
As with the justices’ votes in mandatory and discretionary
cases, the question arises whether survey responses were associated with media reporting. Figure 4 shows the relation
between justices’ survey scores and the percentage of media

Ma’ariv jointly enjoyed an exposure rate of 47.5% for all individuals above the age of 18. The biannual TGI survey measures newspaper readership among other topics. See Hagai Kraus, TGI Survey: Israel Today Increases the Gap, WALLA (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://b.walla.co.il/?w=//1781680.
50. In addition to articles about the justices’ general criminal-case
decisions, special attention was focused on the press coverage of
the high-profile case of former Israel President Moshe Katzav,
who was convicted of rape and other charges in December 2010.
Isabel Kershner, Israeli Court Upholds Rape Conviction of Ex-President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/world/middleeast/israelssupreme-court-upholds-rape-conviction-of-ex-president.html.
ISC consideration of his appeal began on August 7, 2011, by Justices Arbel, Joubran, and Naor. The justices in the Katzav case
received wide media coverage during the time our survey was
conducted. Discussion in the media about the justices began
when the panel was selected; thus, much of the coverage occurred
before our survey. The defendant’s conviction was upheld by the
ISC panel on November 10, 2011. This media coverage included
op-eds and profile articles that depicted both Justices Arbel and
Naor as exhibiting strong pro-state tendencies, while Justice
Joubran was overall portrayed as less pro-state. This may have
affected the public perception with respect to these particular justices.

TABLE 3. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF ISC JUSTICES’
CRIMINAL DECISIONS, 2003-2011
MANDATORY
CASES
JUSTICE

DISCRETIONARY
CASES

NUMBER OF
ARTICLES

NUMBER OF
PRO-DEFENDANT

PERCENT OF
PRO-DEFENDANT

Arbel

17

1

5.9

Barak

5

1

20.0

Beinisch

7

1

14.3

Berliner

16

2

12.5

Elon

6

4

66.7

Fogelman

4

2

50.0

Grunis

16

12

75.0

Hayut

9

2

22.2

Joubran

12

5

41.6

Kheshin, D.

5

3

60.0

Levy

1

1

6.3

Melcer

4

1

25.0

Naor

3

3

60.0

Procaccia

18

3

16.7

Rivlin

6

3

50.0

Rubinstein

7

2

28.6

CONCLUSION

Recognizing the gap between perception of judges’ voting
activity and how they actually vote is important to fairly evaluate judges. We have presented evidence that a small number
of discretionary cases and media reports shape perceptions
more than the mass of mandatory-jurisdiction cases. The perception that a judge is biased toward the state or the defendant
can be inconsistent with the judge’s voting pattern in the mass
of cases, as our data show for some ISC justices. As we demonstrated, Justice Arbel is perceived as the most pro-state justice
with no basis for that perception in her voting record. Justice
Naor is perceived as pro-state but in fact voted for defendants
more than any other justice in mandatory-jurisdiction cases.
Justices Elon and Melcer are perceived as pro-defendant with
no basis for that in their voting pattern in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. Suggestions or innuendo that these justices are
FIGURE 4.
RELATION BETWEEN SURVEY RESPONSES AND MEDIA COVERAGE
3.5

Note: The table shows the rate at which each justice voted for the state’s position in
mandatory and discretionary criminal cases. A vote favored the state if it was to affirm
an appeal brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote
favored the defendant if it was to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an
appeal brought by the defendant. The cases are mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.

state perception. Although Justice Elon was referred to in fewer
articles, the pattern of his media coverage may help explain the
perception of him as pro-defendant despite his voting pattern
in mandatory cases, which tended to favor the state.
The precision of the media-coverage survey score and discretionary-case survey score relations are subject to the limitation of small numbers of observations. Table 3 shows few
newspaper stories for several justices, and Table 2 shows few
discretionary cases for several justices. Nevertheless, the available evidence is that both media coverage and discretionarycase voting patterns better explain perceptions of justices than
do voting patterns in the mass of criminal cases, which are
reviewed under mandatory jurisdiction.

51. Characterization of justices in the media may be associated with
an ISC institutional feature we explore elsewhere, justices’ votes
in cases in which they write the Court’s opinion. Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rozen-Zvi, Group Decision Making on
Appellate Panels: Presiding Justice and Opinion Justice Influence in
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stories portraying a justice as pro-defendant. The correlation
coefficient was positive and nearly significant (.48; p = .059),
suggesting a reasonable association between media coverage
and perceptions. This result is similar to, but slightly stronger
than, the association between survey scores and discretionarycase outcomes. If one excludes the most outlying justice in the
figure, Justice Naor, the correlation coefficient was .61 and significant at p = .017. So both discretionary-case votes and media
reports were associated with perceptions of justices to a much
greater degree than mandatory-case votes.51 Discretionary-case
outcomes and media reports were not linearly correlated (coefficient = .13; p = .633).
Media coverage is most helpful in explaining perceptions of
Justice Arbel. Her votes in both mandatory- and discretionaryjurisdiction cases are not consistent with the perception of her
as the most pro-state justice. She was mentioned in more articles than all but one of the justices in our media survey. Those
articles, as shown in Table 3, may be the reason for the pro-
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Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and media reporting about
ISC justices in criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli
legal community shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents’ perceptions of ISC
justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five,
with one being the most pro-state. Newspaper coverage was based on the media results
reported in Table 3.

the Israel Supreme Court, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming Aug. 2013).
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biased in favor of one party or the other in criminal cases
might be demonstrably unfair.
Perceptions may be shaped by factors we cannot assess here,
such as the dominance of a few cases that are regarded as
important. Such cases surely influence the public’s perceptions.
But the full evaluation of a justice should include his or her
behavior in the mass of cases as well as in the few. In the nonIsraeli context, few studies thoroughly and objectively assess
judicial behavior in a manner that would support claims of
bias. Studies tend to lack full samples of judges’ cases due to
limitations of available opinions or nonpublic votes to grant
review. Our Israel-based study demonstrates that such limitations can distort perceptions of judicial performance.
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